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GIVENS V. MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC AND THE 
UNRESOLVED CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 




 The natural gas industry is central to the United States economy. 
However, due to vague regulations and judicial leniency, natural gas 
pipeline companies have almost zero restraint in exercising eminent 
domain. Their current operations mirror that of the federal 
government’s authority to exercise immediate possession. Recently, 
landowners have contested the pipeline industry’s authority to 
exercise eminent domain, which has developed into a circuit split. The 
Fourth Circuit, and the six other circuits that have followed suit, hold 
that pipeline companies have the substantive right to immediate entry 
and are entitled to a preliminary injunction before a trial on just 
compensation. The Seventh Circuit holds that the courts do not have 
the authority to grant immediate entry, and the pipeline company must 
complete the entire standard condemnation process before entering 
the property. In 2019, there were two attempts to bring this issue 
before the Supreme Court, and both attempts failed. This Note 
evaluates the most recent attempt in Givens v. Mountain Valley 
Pipeline, LLC and argues that the Supreme Court should address this 






† J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, Spring 2021. This Note is 
dedicated to my mother, my best friend who passed away shortly before I started 
writing this. I would not be the woman, wife, daughter, sister, or friend I am today 
without her. I would like to thank my dad for pushing me outside my comfort zone, 
my brother for keeping me laughing, and most importantly my husband, 
Christopher, for always believing in me. Lastly, I am grateful for the Texas A&M 
Law School community, specifically, Professor Carol Pauli, Professor Neil Sobol, 
my Note and Comment Editor Eddy Garza, and my Executive Editor Alexandra 
Lizano for their encouragement and keeping me on track throughout this challenging 
process.   
  
138 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 138 
II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................. 141 
A. The Natural Gas Act and Eminent Domain ..................... 141 
B. The Development of Pipeline v. Property  
Owner Cases ......................................................................... 145 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT .................................................................... 148 
A. The Fourth Circuit Sage Approach ................................. 148 
B. The Seventh Circuit Northern Border Pipeline  
Approach .............................................................................. 150 
C. The Supreme Court Should Provide Clarity .................... 151 
IV. SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS ............................................ 153 
A. Recent Supreme Court Attempts ...................................... 153 
B. The Supreme Court should adopt the Seventh  
Circuit Approach. ................................................................. 157 
1. The NGA Does Not Authorize Immediate  
Possession ...................................................................... 157 
2. Courts Have Exceeded the Limits of Equity .............. 159 
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 161 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most couples spend decades planning and saving for 
retirement. They will plan almost their entire lives around their 
retirement goals and spend their life savings on making that dream a 
reality.1 For one couple, that meant purchasing a farm in rural 
Virginia.2 For over a decade, they used this farm as a source of income 
as they approached retirement by growing crops, raising cattle, and 
renting out the home on the property.3 However, what they initially 
believed to be a safe investment started slipping through their hands 
in 2014.4 Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC began building a 303-mile 
pipeline with plans to run the pipeline directly through the couple’s 
 
 1. Ultimate guide to retirement, CNN MONEY 
https://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/basics_basics.moneymag/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EM9T-K9L7]. 
 2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 
140 S. Ct. 300 (2019) (Mem.) (No. 19-54). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Pamela King, Va. widow leads eminent domain fight at Supreme Court, E&E 
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060934045 
[https://perma.cc/QAG6-BABE]. 
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land.5 Their retirement dreams began to fracture when Mountain 
Valley initiated eminent domain proceedings against them.6 The 
couple, Karolyn and the late Clarence Givens, fought back and 
attempted to take their battle to the Supreme Court.7 In October 2019, 
that fight came to an end when the Court denied their petition for writ 
of certiorari.8 While this did not come as a shock—the Supreme Court 
denied a similar writ of certiorari in 2019—what the Givens might not 
have known in the beginning is that the system is inherently against 
them.9 
Amid strife between global political leaders and the threat of 
other countries’ burgeoning oil and gas industries, the United States 
grasps on to its energy independence and remains an integral force in 
the global oil and gas industry.10 However, the fear of having to rely 
solely on U.S. adversaries like Saudi Arabia and Russia for energy 
creates a heightened sense of urgency in securing the U.S. oil and gas 
market.11 The incessant demand for oil and gas has prompted a surge 
of natural gas pipeline development, and with the ever-present fear of 
becoming energy dependent, legislators have heavily favored placing 
oil and gas companies in the best and easiest position possible to do 
business.12 As a result, the industry is booming with pipeline projects 
such as one in the Appalachian Basin where $32.6 billion in 
investments will generate 3,500 miles of “new, repurposed or replaced 
pipelines across Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.”13  
 
 5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019) (No. 19-
54). 
 6. Id. at 8.  
 7. King, supra note 4.  
 8. Charles Fishburne, Supreme Court Denies Appeal of Eminent Domain for 
Mountain Valley Pipeline, VPM NPR PBS (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://vpm.org/news/articles/7532/supreme-court-denies-appeal-of-eminent-
domain-for-mountain-valley-pipeline [https://perma.cc/3HV4-A5VJ].  
 9. John Kramer, U.S. Supreme Court Denies Cert in Case Dealing with 




 10. Jude Clemente, Three Things to Know About the U.S. Oil and Natural Gas 
Industry, FORBES (May 15, 2019, 9:23 A.M.) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2019/05/15/3-things-to-know-about-
the-u-s-oil-and-natural-gas-industry/#2a01a9cafa67 [https://perma.cc/58JE-54DE]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Nicole Jacobs & Dan Alfaro, Infographic: More Than $32 Billion Being 
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However, these pipeline projects, like all things, come at a 
cost.14 The burden of the robust natural gas pipeline industry is carried 
on the backs of private landowners, like the Givens, who would have 
never once imagined their land would be taken by the U.S. 
government, much less a natural gas pipeline company.15 Private 
landowners have been deprived of their property without receiving 
just compensation before the taking and have sometimes gone years 
without seeing a penny from the natural gas companies.16  
The Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) outlines the process in which 
natural gas companies can seize private land for public use through 
standard condemnation proceedings.17 However, the majority of 
district courts grant preliminary injunctions to natural gas companies, 
allowing them to enter and use the land before a trial on just 
compensation.18 This begs the question of whether the courts are going 
beyond the powers delegated to them in the NGA.19  
In an effort to rein in the courts, there have been two attempts 
to have the Supreme Court take up this issue in 2019 alone.20 This 
Note will evaluate the most recent attempt in the Fourth Circuit case 
of Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline. Specifically, this Note will 
focus on two questions: (1) whether there is a circuit split that would 
warrant Supreme Court intervention and (2) whether it is in the power 
of the courts to issue a preliminary injunction before a trial on just 
compensation. The Note agrees with the petitioners in Givens arguing 
that there is a circuit split that should be evaluated by the Supreme 
 
Invested in Appalachian Basin Pipelines, ENERGY IN DEPTH (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.energyindepth.org/infographic-more-than-32-billion-being-invested-
appalachian-basin-pipelines/ [https://perma.cc/2MTB-79DB]. 
 14. John Kramer, New Findings: Pipeline Companies Flout Law Nationwide, 




 15. Id. 
 16. RJ Vogt, Land Grab: Property Owners Fight Back Against Pipeline IOUs, 
LAW 360 (April 28, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1153244 
[https://perma.cc/KK4B-MLWQ]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jeremy P. Hopkins & Elizabeth M. Hopkins, Separation of Powers: A 
Forgotten Protection in the Context of Eminent Domain and the Natural Gas Act, 
16 REGENT U.L. REV. 371, 373 (2004). 
 19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, 
LLC, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019) (No. 19-54). 
 20. Vogt, supra note 16.  
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Court, and the courts are beyond the bounds of the NGA in issuing 
preliminary injunctions before a trial on just compensation. This Note 
evaluates whether the courts are following the provisions of the NGA, 
not whether the courts are going beyond the bounds of the 
Constitution.21 
Section II will provide the statutory and case law backdrop to 
Givens. It will provide an overview of the natural gas pipeline’s 
authority to exercise eminent domain under the NGA and a summary 
of the process pipeline companies go through to obtain the ability to 
condemn private property under the NGA. This section will also 
explain the development of case law on this issue, along with a more 
in-depth understanding of how the circuit split developed. Section III 
will define the circuit split and describe in detail the primary cases that 
outline the split.  
Section IV will elaborate on the Supreme Court developments 
on this issue. It will describe the recent attempts to bring this issue to 
the Supreme Court. This section will argue that the Court needs to 
adopt the approach of the Seventh Circuit. Lastly, this section will 
explore the pipeline company’s rights at the time a court grants a 
preliminary injunction and how the courts have exceeded their 
discretion in granting these preliminary injunctions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Natural Gas Act and Eminent Domain 
The NGA enables certain private entities in the energy 
industry, like natural gas pipeline companies, to exercise eminent 
domain.22 The authority to exercise eminent domain rests with the 
legislature; however, Congress can delegate this authority to private 
entities.23 When Congress delegates this power, it must do so 
expressly, and the power granted must not be greater “than those 
expressed or necessarily implied.”24 In other words, private entities 
 
 21. For further reading on the constitutionality of the Court’s actions under the 
NGA please refer to Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18 at 371.  
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2006).  
 23. Jim Behnke & Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to Immediate Entry by 
Private Entities Exercising Federal Eminent Domain Authority Under the Natural 
Gas Act and the Federal Power Act, 27 ENERGY L.J. 499, 502 (2006). 
 24. Id.  
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with delegated eminent domain power are limited to exercise eminent 
domain within the scope that Congress has expressly specified in the 
enabling statute.25 Standard eminent domain and quick-take are the 
two main types of eminent domain procedures.26 The NGA authorizes 
pipeline companies to use standard eminent domain procedures.27 
The NGA authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) to regulate the natural gas industry.28 The 
FERC regulates natural gas projects, the interstate transmission of 
natural gas, and other energy issues related to electricity and gas.29 The 
Commission sets out the procedure for regulatory approval, including 
obtaining right of ways from private landowners.30 Therefore, the 
FERC is responsible for providing an appropriate process for pipeline 
companies to obtain eminent domain authority.31 It does so by 
overseeing and implementing the application process to obtain a 
certification of “public convenience of necessity.”32 The NGA 
requires public convenience and necessity certification of all pipeline 
companies engaging in the transportation or sale of natural gas.33 This 
certification’s purpose is to create a threshold level of necessity that 
pipeline companies must meet to exercise eminent domain.34 
However, once a certificate is issued, it does not automatically give 
the pipeline company the authority to enter the property immediately, 
such as in a quick-take proceeding.35 Pipeline companies still have to 
go through standard eminent procedures.36 While only two pipeline 
projects have been denied their pipeline proposals over the past thirty 
years, the process of obtaining the proper authority to exercise 
standard eminent domain powers is elaborate, overwhelming, and 
 
 25. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 379–80. 
 26. Victoria Mazzola, Comment, Putting the Pieces of the Puzzle Together: The 
Natural Gas Pipeline Approval Process is a Procedural Jigsaw, 64 VILL. L. REV. 
459, 467 (2019).  
 27. Id.  
 28. § 717o. 
 29. About FERC, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, 
https://www.ferc.gov/about/what-ferc [https://perma.cc/6AHJ-2UX7]. 
 30. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 464. 
 31. § 717o. 
 32. § 717(d). 
 33. § 717(c)(1)(a).  
 34. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 502. 
 35. Id.  
 36. § 717f(h). 
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lengthy for pipeline companies, much less private landowners, to 
navigate.37  
When a company is interested in constructing a new interstate 
pipeline, the first step is to apply for certification of public 
convenience with the FERC.38 The application includes a description 
of the pipeline, a statement of the facts explaining why the pipeline is 
necessary, and an approximate start and end date of the construction 
of the pipeline.39 Once the application is submitted, the FERC’s 
experts, including professionals in the scientific, legal, and economic 
fields, evaluate factors relating to the pipeline’s cultural and 
environmental impacts.40 Then, the FERC submits the application for 
public comment.41 When the project becomes open for public 
comment, private property owners who might be affected by the 
pipeline are notified by mail that their property may be subject to 
eminent domain proceedings.42 Following public comment, the FERC 
conducts public hearings on the proposed application.43 The FERC 
then reviews the application as a whole and decides whether to accept 
the application.44 During this process, the pipeline company can make 
changes to the pipeline route, and the company is not required to have 
secured all the necessary state and federal permits.45 If the FERC 
approves the pipeline company’s application for certification, the 
company and the citizens affected by the construction begin 
negotiations regarding compensation price and easement 
agreements.46 
At this stage, when private landowners refuse to sell or 
negotiate with pipeline companies, which occurs often, pipeline 
companies can file condemnation actions against the private 
landowners in a federal district court.47 The NGA delegates 
jurisdiction to federal courts to decide eminent domain cases.48 In 
 
 37. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 463–64. 
 38. Id. at 469. 
 39. § 717f(d); 18 C.F.R. 153.7 (2020). 
 40. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 469. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. § 717f(d). 
 44. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 469. 
 45. Id. at 470.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 467.  
 48. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 502.  
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granting jurisdiction, the NGA outlines the procedures the court must 
use to determine how immediate entry and other issues related to 
eminent domain should be resolved.49 The federal courts have abided 
by a three-prong elemental test outlined in the NGA.50 The elements 
are as follows: (1) the party must have obtained a FERC certificate of 
public convenience and necessity; (2) the party has attempted but 
failed to acquire the substantive rights required to “construct, operate, 
and maintain a FERC-approved pipeline” because the private property 
owners and the pipeline company cannot reach an agreement; and (3) 
the property value sought must be over $3,000.51 
While the courts follow these procedures, the issue here is that 
the courts might be undermining the authority the NGA has delegated 
to them. One of the chief arguments of landowners involved in these 
suits is that the courts are impliedly allowing quick-take procedures 
while no legislative authority has expressly allowed the courts to do 
so and, therefore, disregarding standard eminent domain procedures.52 
In a standard eminent domain procedure, the party preparing to 
condemn the property files a condemnation action in one proceeding, 
and the court determines the amount of compensation at a separate 
proceeding after the condemnation proceeding.53 At the compensation 
proceeding, the party bringing the condemnation action decides to 
either purchase the property at the determined price or dismiss the 
action.54 The title does not pass until after the condemning party pays 
just compensation to the appropriate property owner, and then the 
condemning party can seize the property.55  
In comparison, quick-take procedures are harsh and intrusive 
because of the government’s swift action in obtaining the land.56 In a 
quick-take proceeding, the condemning party files a “Declaration of 
Taking” and deposits what it assumes the monetary value of the 
property to be with the court.57 Once the condemning party completes 
 
 49. Id.  
 50. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 467. 
 51. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2006).  
 52. E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 824 (4th Cir. 2004).  
 53. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 468. 
 54. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 384.  
 55. Id. at 386–87.  
 56. Id. at 372. 
 57. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 468. 
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this two-step process, the party may seize the property, and they have 
obtained title to the land.58  
Typically, as seen in most of the cases on this issue, after the 
pipeline company has obtained the FERC certificate, the company 
initiates eminent domain proceedings against resisting landowners.59 
Routinely, the pipeline company moves for “summary judgment on its 
substantive right to take the easements by eminent domain” and 
requests a preliminary injunction for access and possession during the 
proceedings.60 Landowners could argue that this current procedure 
resembles quick-take procedures because when the court grants a 
preliminary injunction before a trial on just compensation, it allows 
the pipeline company to enjoy all the benefits of having title to the 
property before a trial on just compensation.61 In other words, the 
preliminary injunction grants the pipeline company immediate access, 
bypassing the necessary procedures of a standard eminent domain 
proceeding, and it postpones the just compensation phase until after 
the party exercising condemnation has received possession of the 
property.62 This procedure raises the question of whether the courts 
are complying with the NGA because the NGA does not expressly 
state that quick-take procedures or immediate possession are 
permitted.63   
B. The Development of Pipeline v. Property Owner Cases 
The two main approaches to pipeline condemnation 
proceedings have developed over the past few decades. The attitudes 
of the courts towards eminent domain have evolved since the first time 
a court denied immediate entry to a private company possessing 
eminent domain authority in 1957.64 In Algonquin Gas Transmission 
v. Herman Yules, a natural gas company held a certificate of public 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. James W. Adams, Craig D. Stocker, & Lynne M. Jurek, The Business of Gas 
Pipeline Condemnation: A Multistate Analysis, 13 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 128, 142.  
 60. Mountain Valley Pipeline v. 6.56 Acres of Land, 915 F.3d 197, 210 (4th Cir. 
2019). 
 61. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 380.  
 62. Id. at 405.  
 63. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 2.14 Acres, 907 
F.3d 725, 736 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 64. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 542. This unpublished case is only 
available in the files of The Sage Approach authors. 
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convenience and necessity issued by the now-defunct Federal Power 
Commission (the FERC has taken over the role of the Federal Power 
Commission).65 The gas company argued that the court could exercise 
its inherent equity discretion and grant the gas company immediate 
entry before a trial on just compensation.66 The court ultimately denied 
the petition for immediate entry.67 However, the court noted that there 
may be circumstances where granting immediate entry would be 
suitable.68 In denying the petition, the court found that the pipeline 
company suffered minimal prejudice, and this result avoided harm to 
the landowner.69  
Pipeline eminent domain issues were not litigated again until 
the early 1980s.70 At this time, courts took a turn that has endured 
through the decades and is central to this Note. Courts began to 
exercise their equity jurisdiction in deciding these cases.71 For 
example, in 1981, a district court decided that it could exercise its 
inherent powers to provide equitable relief; therefore, the court 
granted the pipeline company the right to enter the land before a trial 
on just compensation.72  
In Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, the 
pipeline company obtained a FERC certificate of public convenience 
and sought “immediate possession of the right of way and easements” 
of the land at issue.73 The pipeline company argued that it was entitled 
to immediate possession through equitable relief.74 The court reasoned 
that the pipeline company was entitled to equitable relief because it 
satisfied both parts of the two-prong test for equitable relief.75 In the 
first step, the plaintiff must demonstrate that either the “primary right 
. . . must be equitable rather than legal or the remedy sought must be 
equitable.”76 In the second step, the plaintiff must articulate that it is 
 
 65. Id. at 525–26.  
 66. Id. at 526.  
 67. Id. at 526–27. 
 68. Id. at 500. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 525.  
 71. N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 170, 172 
(D.N.D. 1981).  
 72. Id. at 173. 
 73. Id. at 171. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 173.  
 76. Id. at 172. (“If the legal remedy is inadequate, the court may exercise its 
equitable jurisdiction.”).  
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“subject to imminent, irreparable injury in the absence of a grant of 
equitable relief.”77 The court found that the pipeline company 
demonstrated that the legal remedy, a standard condemnation 
proceeding, was “inadequate under the circumstances.”78 The pipeline 
company explained that it would not be able to meet its construction 
deadlines and budget if it had to go through the standard condemnation 
proceeding.79 Construction personnel was ready to initiate 
construction in the disputed area, which made immediate possession 
necessary.80 The court recognized these reasons as sufficient and 
granted equitable relief on the condition that the pipeline company 
deposited the estimated cost of just compensation with the court’s 
registry.81  
In light of this case, it is important to note that the court here 
recognized that the pipeline company did not have the authority under 
the NGA to exercise immediate possession “prior to a condemnation 
proceeding.”82 That power only rests with the federal government, and 
“no statutory authority exists” that would enable the plaintiffs to 
exercise this power.83 However, the court still decided that the pipeline 
company was able to obtain immediate possession through equitable 
relief, which set the standard of these cases for years to come.84 
The division between pipeline eminent domain approaches hit 
a milestone in 1998. The Seventh Circuit denied immediate entry to a 
pipeline company in Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of 
Land.85 In this case, the court reasoned that it could not exercise 
equitable relief in favor of the pipeline company.86 In 2004, the Fourth 
Circuit took an opposing view in East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. 
Sage.87 The court held that it could provide injunctive relief and 
 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 172–73. 
 79. Id. at 172.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 173.  
 82. Id. at 172.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 173.  
 85. N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 471–72 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s holding that “Northern Border ‘has no legal 
right to immediate possession under either federal substantive law or Illinois 
substantive law’”). 
 86. Id. at 471.  
 87. E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that “the court may exercise equitable power to grant the remedy of immediate 
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granted the pipeline company the right of immediate entry.88 Since the 
Sage decision, the majority of circuit courts have followed the Sage 
approach.89 Only the Seventh Circuit has stood by the rule articulated 
in Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land.90  
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The chief issue in these cases is simple but creates a cloud of 
confusion regarding how the federal courts should handle this issue. 
After a pipeline company obtains a FERC certificate, the majority of 
U.S. district courts have granted a preliminary injunction in favor of 
the pipeline companies to take the land before a trial on just 
compensation.91 However, the NGA does not expressly allow for 
immediate possession before a trial on just compensation, and it could 
be argued that the NGA impliedly denies the court the ability to grant 
a preliminary injunction.92 The conflict that has arisen between the 
circuit courts centers around the question of whether the court can 
issue a preliminary injunction without the express authority from the 
NGA—it is a statutory construction issue, not a question of 
constitutionality.93  
A. The Fourth Circuit Sage Approach 
Sage outlines the approach that favors granting a  preliminary 
injunction and allowing pipeline companies to operate on the land 
before a trial on just compensation.94 In Sage, the East Tennessee 
Natural Gas Company was constructing a pipeline “over 1,300 tracts 
of land in Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina.”95 After 
negotiating with hundreds of landowners and initiating 133 
landowners were still fighting condemnation.96 In these proceedings, 
the company filed motions for immediate possession of the easements 
 
possession through the issuance of a preliminary injunction”).  
 88. Id. at 828. 
 89. Vogt, supra note 16. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 373.  
 93. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land, 915 F.3d 197, 213 
(4th Cir. 2019). 
 94. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 544. 
 95. E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 819 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 96. Id. at 819–20. 
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and argued that the court could exercise equitable relief.97 The district 
court held that it could use its inherent powers to grant a preliminary 
injunction, an equitable remedy.98 The court relied on the fact that 
stalling the construction of the pipeline would lead to an “extended 
delay.”99 The landowners filed an appeal with the Fourth Circuit, 
arguing that the NGA does not grant the pipeline companies the ability 
to obtain immediate possession because the statute does not include 
the ability to use quick-take proceedings.100 Additionally, the court 
must construe eminent domain statutes strictly and, therefore, could 
not invoke equity principles.101   
Sage severed the FERC certification right to take the land from 
the trial of just compensation.102 In doing so, it only reviewed the 
FERC certification for the pipeline’s right to condemn.103 Here, the 
court held that the use of a preliminary injunction was appropriate 
where the district court had determined that the FERC certificate 
established the pipeline company’s right to exercise eminent 
domain.104 The court noted that a preliminary injunction provides 
sufficient procedural safeguards for landowners that are even more 
protective than a quick-take proceeding.105 
Regarding the landowner’s second argument, the court 
reasoned that a strictly construed statute does not bar the court from 
exercising the principles of equity.106 The court pointed out that the 
landowners overlooked the overwhelming public interest the pipeline 
serves.107 The Sage court rendered a preliminary injunction with 
equity because it determined that the pipeline company met the 
requirements for a mandatory preliminary injunction, and it is likely 
that the pipeline would be granted the condemnation right in the future 
because of the FERC certification.108  
 
 97. Id. at 820. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 820, 822, 824. 
 101. Id. at 826. 
 102. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19–20, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54). 
 103. Sage, 361 F.3d at 820.  
 104. Id. at 823.  
 105. Id. at 825–26. 
 106. Id. at 826. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 818, 830, 828.  
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In sum, the Sage approach requires that: (1) the pipeline 
company demonstrates it has the right to take under the FERC; (2) the 
conditions for preliminary injunctive relief are satisfied and 
mandatory; and (3) the landowner’s compensation is adequately 
secured. 109 In evaluating whether to grant the preliminary injunction, 
the court looks to four factors: “(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm 
to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied, (2) the likelihood of harm to 
the defendant if the injunction is granted, (3) the likelihood the 
plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and (4) the public interest.”110 
Preliminary injunctions are almost always granted because the 
interstate pipelines serve an overwhelming public need to supply 
energy and hold on to U.S. energy independence.111 Additionally, 
courts have reasoned that the pipeline companies will face irreparable 
harm if they are required to wait for a trial on just compensation.112 
B. The Seventh Circuit Northern Border Pipeline Approach 
The Seventh Circuit remains the outlier on this question.113 In 
Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the court had no authority to issue a preliminary 
injunction because the Northern Border Pipeline Company had no 
preexisting entitlement to the land.114 In this case, the pipeline 
company obtained a FERC certificate, because the company was “not 
content with the pace of ordinary eminent domain proceeding[s],” so 
it moved for immediate possession of the property.115 The pipeline 
company argued that the court should grant a mandatory preliminary 
injunction.116 The district court denied the pipeline company’s request, 
and the pipeline company appealed.117 On appeal, the circuit court 
affirmed the district court’s decision.118 The court reasoned that a 
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preliminary injunction was only available “when the moving party has 
a substantive entitlement to the relief sought.”119 While the company 
argued that it has a substantive right to the property through its 
eminent domain power under the NGA, the court hinged its decision 
on the fact that the company’s rights were not “fully vested before the 
initiation of the lawsuit.”120 In other words, without a preexisting right 
to the land, the court would not issue a preliminary injunction.121 The 
Seventh Circuit’s approach does not recognize a pipeline company’s 
substantive right until it has been granted and will not grant the right 
to condemn based on what might happen in the future.122 While the 
Fourth Circuit interprets the FERC as granting a substantive right, the 
Seventh Circuit recognizes that this right is granted after the 
proceeding on just compensation.123   
C. The Supreme Court Should Provide Clarity 
There has been pushback from pipeline companies on this 
split. In Mountain Valley’s brief in opposition to the petition for writ 
of certiorari, it argued that there is no circuit split. The company 
argued that the Seventh Circuit approach evaluates a completely 
different area of the law and that the Seventh Circuit agrees with the 
Sage approach.124 Mountain Valley argued that the Seventh Circuit did 
not even reach this issue because the pipeline company asserted it had 
a substantive right based solely on its FERC certificate of public 
convenience and did not initiate standard eminent domain proceedings 
at the district court level.125 According to Mountain Valley, and the 
other cases on this issue, the pipeline company based its substantive 
right on its FERC certificate of public convenience and the standard 
condemnation proceedings at the district court level after obtaining the 
certification.126 Mountain Valley argued that taking these two steps 
together gives pipeline companies the authority to exercise eminent 
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domain.127 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit did not grant the injunction 
because the pipeline company did not obtain orders determining its 
substantive right to the property before filing a motion for immediate 
possession.128 Mountain Valley reasoned that this would have been the 
same outcome in every other circuit court because each circuit agrees 
that there must be a “finding of authority to condemn by the district 
court before an immediate-possession injunction can be awarded.”129  
The Seventh Circuit applies a different meaning to the FERC 
certification.130 Karolyn Givens argued in her petition for certiorari 
that there is a circuit split because the FERC certification does not give 
companies a preexisting entitlement to possession, which is the view 
other circuit courts apply.131 The FERC certification allows pipeline 
companies to participate in the process of obtaining the substantive 
right, but the only way to obtain the right is to complete the entire 
process, including a trial on just compensation.132 Courts cannot 
assume that they will complete the process—they must complete it.133 
The other circuits are satisfied with companies entering the process 
and view this as enough to obtain the rights.134 In other words, entering 
the process is enough to rely on for a preliminary injunction. The 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that granting a preliminary injunction would 
only be appropriate where the “substantive entitlement to the relief 
sought . . . was fully vested even before the initiation of the lawsuit.”135 
This approach on the use of preliminary injunctions is fundamentally 
different than the approach other circuit courts take, which is that the 
FERC certificate essentially gives the pipline companies the 
substantive right.136 The Seventh Circuit recognizes that the FERC 
does not give the pipeline company any “substantive entitlement to the 
land right now;” therefore, the pipeline company cannot point to any 
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authority that gives it a substantive right, and the court cannot use a 
preliminary injunction to grant them immediate possession. 137 
In sum, a circuit split exists because the Seventh Circuit in 
Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land placed a 
different meaning on the FERC certification process, and the pipeline 
companies are entitled to compare the legal authority to the Fourth 
Circuit and the other circuit courts that have followed the Sage 
approach. The Seventh Circuit holds that the FERC certification does 
not grant pipeline companies a substantive right, but the certification 
lets them enter the process towards obtaining a substantive right.138 
The Fourth Circuit holds that the FERC certification essentially grants 
pipeline companies a substantive right at the time the certification is 
issued, and the use of a preliminary injunction hastens the enforcement 
of the substantive right.139 
IV. SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS 
As the circuit split illustrates, there is confusion among 
landowners about the status and security of their property. With their 
livelihood threatened, some landowners have fought condemnation 
with the hopes that the Supreme Court will change the course of the 
circuit and district courts.140 However, the Court denied two 
opportunities to resolve this dispute in 2019.141 
A. Recent Supreme Court Attempts 
The recent increase in pipeline development projects across the 
northeast has led to a surge of pipeline eminent domain litigation.142 
For example, a major player in the natural gas pipeline industry, 
Transcontinental, was involved in five cases in federal circuit courts 
in 2018, compared to only six from 1989 to 2017.143 The recent 
pipeline construction proposals have led to disruption in rural 
communities, and some homeowners have decided to fight back. In 
 
 137. Id.; see N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 471–
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2019 alone, there have been two attempts to bring this to the Supreme 
Court’s attention.144  
The first attempt came out of the Third Circuit, where the 
circuit court upheld the grant of a preliminary injunction and 
specifically looked at whether the district court effectively granted a 
quick-take rather than proceeding under standard eminent domain 
guidelines.145 The circuit court reasoned that this was not a quick-take 
because the pipeline company followed the proper procedures outlined 
for standard eminent domain at the district court level.146 Here, the 
landowners argued that “the use of a preliminary injunction amounted 
to a quick-take,” and the NGA does not afford pipeline companies the 
authority to use quick-take procedures to obtain title to a property; 
therefore, the courts are usurping the power of the legislature by 
utilizing preliminary injunctions in this way.147 In response, the court 
reasoned that quick-take procedures and the use of preliminary 
injunctions have “meaningful distinctions in law.”148 Specifically, 
because the pipeline company had obtained a FERC public 
convenience certification, it already obtained the substantive right to 
enter the property.149 The use of a preliminary injunction “hastened 
the enforcement of the substantive right—it did not create new 
rights.”150  
Regardless of whether the use of a preliminary injunction 
amounts to quick-take, the landowners also argued that the NGA does 
not provide for immediate possession, which preliminary injunction 
necessarily produces.151 The court’s response to this was that the NGA 
does not specify that the “rules governing preliminary injunctions 
should be suspended in condemnation proceedings.”152 In other words, 
the NGA does not get rid of this equitable remedy, and courts are 
within their authority to exercise this power, regardless of whether it 
amounts to immediate possession.153 In sum, the district court did not 
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usurp legislative authority in granting the preliminary injunction, and 
the NGA does not rule out the use of preliminary injunctions.154 
The second attempt, which is the primary focus of this Note, is 
from the Fourth Circuit in Mountain Valley Pipeline v. 6.56 Acres of 
Land. The central question in the case was whether the pipeline 
company could gain access to the easements at moment it received 
FERC certification or if it had to wait until a trial on just compensation 
to start construction.155 The district court held that the pipeline 
company did not have to wait until the court determined just 
compensation and affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the 
company a preliminary injunction to access the easements and begin 
construction.156  
Courts use a four-pronged test when determining whether to 
grant a preliminary injunction, and here, the court found that Mountain 
Valley satisfied all four elements.157 The first element is the likelihood 
of success on the merits, which Mountain Valley easily satisfied 
because it had the right to condemn the landowner’s property, and 
Mountain Valley obtained the substantive right to the property through 
a partial summary judgment at the district court level.158 The second 
element is whether the party would suffer irreparable injury, and the 
court reasoned that Mountain Valley would suffer irreparable injury 
because the extremely long delay in construction would likely hinder 
Mountain Valley from meeting its October 2020 deadline mandated 
by the FERC.159 The court believed this element was important 
because if Mountain Valley had to wait until the determination of just 
compensation for the hundreds of landowners involved in this case, it 
would be well past the October 2020 deadline set out by the FERC and 
would cost Mountain Valley millions of dollars to stall construction.160 
The third element is a balance of equities, and here, the court found 
the losses suffered by Mountain Valley far exceeded whatever harm 
the landowners suffered as a result of the preliminary injunction.161 
Additionally, the landowners identified harms that “would be inflicted 
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as a result of the eminent domain itself,” not because of the 
preliminary injunction.162 The last element focuses on public interest, 
and in relying on the report issued by the FERC, the court determined 
the project would serve a public need.163 
The plaintiffs here argued that the appellate court should 
overrule the Sage decision because the NGA does not allow for 
immediate possession.164 The landowners asserted that by expressly 
providing for standard condemnation proceedings, the NGA 
forecloses the possibility that courts can grant possession “through the 
equitable remedy of a preliminary injunction.”165 The circuit court did 
not adopt this approach and held that Sage governed—allowing the 
court to grant the pipeline company a preliminary injunction, an 
equitable remedy.166  
In July 2019, property owners in the Mountain Valley case 
filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, arguing that preliminary 
injunctions were an improper use of federal jurisdictional power.167 
The Court denied certiorari in October 2019, bringing only more 
confusion to the situation.168 While both attempts have failed, this 
demonstration of efforts points toward an ever-growing interest in 
clarifying a pipeline company’s authority in exercising eminent 
domain and whether that authority complies with the NGA.   
The future of pipeline eminent domain litigation hangs in the 
balance after the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari for Givens 
v. Mountain Valley Pipeline. While a denial of certiorari lets the 
appellate decision stand, it does not indicate that the Court agrees with 
the result of the case.169 Whether the Supreme Court agrees with the 
way the lower courts are deciding these cases is up for debate, and it 
is highly possible that these recent attempts will continue to grow in 
number as more pipeline projects continue to expand across the United 
States. 
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B. The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Seventh Circuit Approach 
The Sage approach may exceed the bounds outlined in the 
NGA. Courts have continued to adopt this approach in the interest of 
efficiency but ultimately to the detriment of private property owner’s 
rights. In order to safeguard private property rights, courts should 
follow the clear guidelines of the NGA, which do not give pipeline 
companies the authority to obtain immediate possession of the 
property. Additionally, to prevent altering the substantive rights of the 
parties, courts should stop granting mandatory preliminary injunctions 
in these pipeline-landowner cases. For these reasons, the Supreme 
Court should take up this issue and adopt the Seventh Circuit 
approach.  
1. The NGA Does Not Authorize Immediate Possession 
The NGA is an unambiguous statute—it expressly provides 
that standard eminent domain proceedings are allowed, but it is silent 
on whether the courts should allow immediate possession in the form 
of a preliminary injunction, which closely imitates quick-take 
proceedings.170 The statutory construction canon expressio unius 
strongly favors the exclusion of this provision. Expressio unius is a 
well-settled statutory construction tool, and it means that “expressing 
one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left 
unmentioned.”171 In utilizing this tool, the court must look at the 
context of the statute, and this canon has more force when the party 
can show that Congress excluded the provision by “deliberate choice, 
not inadvertence.”172 The NGA provides for standard condemnation 
proceedings but does not mention the more intrusive quick-take 
proceedings that are reserved only for governmental use. The 
landowners could argue here that the drafters of the NGA specifically 
excluded exceptions to the standard eminent domain proceeding 
because the NGA only mentions standard eminent domain 
proceedings and is silent on quick-take proceedings or the use of any 
other methods to grant immediate possession. The court could 
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consider the exclusion of quick-take proceedings and other forms of 
immediate possession as a deliberate choice because these methods 
are often more intrusive and specifically reserved for the federal 
government.173 Opponents will likely argue that leaving out a 
provision for immediate possession is mere inadvertence. However, 
looking at the context of the statute, one could argue that in a 
proceeding where a third-party deprives a private citizen of his 
property, the court should read the statute narrowly.  
In Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, the 
court reasoned that the condemnation proceeding under the given 
circumstances was inadequate.174 However, while the court found this 
proceeding inadequate, this is exactly what Congress intended. 
Congress alone has the power to delegate eminent domain authority, 
and with that power, Congress is the only branch of government that 
can define eminent domain proceedings.175 Here, the court is taking 
this power into its own hands by creating an expedited method for 
condemnation. If Congress wanted to create an expedited method for 
condemnation proceedings “where the condemner takes the property 
before trial and pays the court-determined price later,” it could.176 That 
is not the case here, and the court should rely on the default rule and 
not give early access to the pipeline companies.177  
Most importantly, and the essential difference between the two 
approaches, is that the court is granting a substantive right before it 
exists. Once just compensation is paid, the pipeline companies have the 
substantive right to exercise eminent domain.178 Up until that point, 
they do not have a vested right in the private landowner’s property.179 
The NGA expressly gives the power of the Takings Clause to pipeline 
companies once they have obtained the necessary certifications.180 The 
NGA specifies the process in which this occurs, and here, the statute 
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provides for standard condemnation proceedings, meaning that the 
right is conferred after just compensation has been provided.181 The 
Supreme Court should adopt the Seventh Circuit approach because it 
appropriately recognizes that the court cannot grant immediate 
possession before the substantive right fully vests. This is the approach 
that is squarely within the bounds of the NGA and most closely follows 
congressional intent.  
2. Courts Have Exceeded the Limits of Equity 
Equity must still follow the law, and courts must not grant a 
remedy that is beyond what a party is entitled to.182 However, in these 
cases, the court accomplishes this by granting a preliminary 
injunction. The court grants the pipeline company a substantive right 
it is not entitled to at the time of the ruling.183  
While the NGA gives jurisdiction to the district courts in 
condemnation proceedings, district courts rely on Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 65 and the judiciary’s inherent 
equitable powers to grant preliminary injunctions.184 FRCP Rule 65(a) 
provides an equitable, injunctive remedy in a NGA condemnation 
proceeding.185 Pipeline companies have to “apply under Rule 65(a) for 
a preliminary injunction awarding immediate possession.”186 The 
inherent power of the court is defined as “those powers ‘necessary to 
the exercise of all others.’”187 This doctrine is grounded in the 
Constitution, and the courts have utilized this power since the 
judiciary’s inception.188 However, the exercise of these powers is not 
limitless.189 While there are efforts to regulate the use of this power, it 
is by no means “uniform.”190  
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Equity must follow the law, and courts cannot impose 
remedies that expand the party’s legal entitlements.191 Principally, the 
Rules Enabling Act demands that when courts employ the federal 
rules, they cannot “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive 
right.”192 The federal courts cannot “displace a [s]tate’s definition of 
its own rights and remedies.”193 However, that is what the courts are 
doing here by stripping away still intact state-property rights before 
title has passed. Here, the courts are expediting the right to the 
property and modifying the right by placing it in the pipeline 
company’s possession right now as compared to in the future. Courts 
utilize preliminary injunctions to maintain the same position of the 
parties while litigation proceeds.194 However, in pipeline-landowner 
cases, the court irreversibly alters the position of the parties when 
issuing a preliminary injunction. After a preliminary injunction, the 
landowners must allow the pipeline company to begin construction.  
Further, it is important to note that courts are issuing 
mandatory preliminary injunctions.195 A mandatory preliminary 
injunction requires affirmative action on the part of the nonmoving 
party, the landowner.196 Courts typically disfavor mandatory 
preliminary injunctions because they are an extraordinary remedy.197 
A mandatory preliminary injunction requires a heightened burden for 
the moving party, the pipeline company, in demonstrating the 
necessary factors for a preliminary injunction.198 When courts grant 
mandatory preliminary injunctions, they disrupt the status of 
landowners because the landowners must allow the pipeline company 
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to enter their land, whereas a standard preliminary injunction does not 
require the plaintiff to take affirmative action.199  
Lastly, while some may argue that simply placing the property 
rights in the hands of those who will inevitably obtain them does not 
modify the right, this view overlooks the importance of timing in 
property rights. The timing of property rights is a significant factor in 
every property relationship.200 If the Supreme Court adopted the 
Seventh Circuit approach, it would ensure that courts do not modify 
the substantive rights of the pipeline companies before they come into 
possession.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Givens likely never expected to be embroiled in a fight 
against a pipeline company about the right to use and the right to 
exclude on their land. What they once believed to be a cautious, 
conservative retirement investment turned into a nation-wide debate 
centered on fundamental property rights. Sometime in the future, 
Karolyn Givens will receive the money that Mountain Valley owes 
her, but there is no definite timeline, and she will receive the money 
well after the pipeline company has done the damage to her property.  
The unmatched development of natural gas pipelines has come 
at a cost too high for private landowners that are often left with no 
other option of fighting back. While it is important to serve the 
interests of the general public, especially in the context of energy, the 
burden heavily infringes on private landowner’s property rights. There 
is a circuit split because the Fourth Circuit recognizes the pipeline 
company’s right to condemn upon completion of the FERC 
certification, while the Seventh Circuit does not recognize it until after 
a trial on just compensation. Courts should adopt the Seventh Circuit 
approach because issuing a preliminary injunction is beyond the 
powers of the judiciary in this context. These injunctions essentially 
create a substantive right for the pipeline company when the company 
is not yet entitled to it. Due to the high cost that the current method 
imposes on private citizen’s property rights, the Supreme Court should 
provide clarity moving forward. Additionally, the judiciary’s role in 
this process should reflect what the NGA specifically intends. The 
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Supreme Court should take up this issue to prevent any further 
infringement on Congress’s power to administer the Takings Clause.  
